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Power Allocation for Energy Efficiency and
Secrecy of Interference Wireless Networks
Z. Sheng, H. D. Tuan, A. A. Nasir, T. Q. Duong and H. V. Poor
Abstract
Considering a multi-user interference network with an eavesdropper, this paper aims at the power
allocation to optimize the worst secrecy throughput among the network links or the secure energy
efficiency in terms of achieved secrecy throughput per Joule under link security requirements. Three
scenarios for the access of channel state information are considered: the perfect channel state information,
partial channel state information with channels from the transmitters to the eavesdropper exponentially
distributed, and not perfectly known channels between the transmitters and the users with exponentially
distributed errors. The paper develops various path-following procedures of low complexity and rapid
convergence for the optimal power allocation. Their effectiveness and viability are illustrated through
numerical examples. The power allocation schemes are shown to achieve both high secrecy throughput
and energy efficiency.
Index Terms
Interference network, secure communication, energy-efficient communication, power allocation,
path-following algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of the wireless medium exhibits different challenges in ensuring secure
communications in the presence of adversarial users [1], [2]. In particular, it is difficult to protect
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2the transmitted signals from unintended recipients, who may improperly extract information from
an ongoing transmission without being detected [3], [4]. Physical layer security [5], [6] has been
proposed as a solution to provide security in wireless networks and researchers with a goal
being to optimize the secure throughput of a wireless network in the presence of eavesdroppers,
which is the difference between the desired user throughput and eavesdroppers’ throughput [2].
Beyond secure throughput, significant interest has recently been put on optimizing the secure
energy efficiency (SEE), which is the ratio of the secure throughput to the total network power
consumption, measured in terms of bits per Joule per Hertz [7], [8].
There has been considerable recent research on physical layer security in wireless communi-
cation systems. For example, assuming the availability of full channel state information (CSI),
secrecy optimization has been studied for cooperative relaying networks in [9]–[11]. Energy
efficiency (EE) of wireless networks has also drawn attention. For examples, resource allocation
algorithms for the optimization of spectral efficiency as well as EE have been established in
[12]. Keeping EE maximization as an objective, the authors in [13] proposed a precoder design
for multi-input-multi-output (MIMO) two-way relay networks. EE maximization for cooperative
spectrum sensing in cognitive sensor networks is studied in [14].
The critical topic of SEE has also been explored very recently [7], [8], [15]–[20]. Specifically,
power control algorithms for SEE maximization in decode-and-forward (DF) and amplify-and-
forward (AF) relaying networks have been considered in [15] and [7], respectively. In [16], the
authors developed a distributed power control algorithm for SEE maximization in DF relaying.
The same resource allocation problem for SEE maximization assuming full-duplex relaying is
considered in [17]. Recently, the authors in [18] and [19] also derived the trade-off between
SEE and secure spectral efficiency in cognitive radio networks. All these works have assumed
the perfect CSI knowledge at the transmitter end, which is not always possible.
It is commonly known that time or frequency resources are generally limited in wireless
networks and thus have to be shared among multiple users. This can result in interference among
users in the network and thus one has to opt for careful resource allocation or interference
alignment schemes [21]. Considering a multiuser MIMO interference network, [20] used the
costly interference alignment technique to cancel both information leakage and interference and
then Dinkelbach’s method of fractional programming is adopted to optimize EE. As shown in
[8], both zero-forcing and interference alignment are not efficient in optimizing the network
SEE.
3In this paper, we propose novel and efficient resource allocation algorithms for both worst-
case secure throughput and worst secure energy efficiency maximization of a highly interference-
limited multi-user wireless network. Unlike many previous works, we do not assume perfect CSI
knowledge at the transmitters. In fact, our transmitters only carry channel distribution knowledge
for the eavesdropper and imperfect CSI for the users. Particularly, we consider three optimization
scenarios to gradually build our algorithms. We start with the “perfect CSI” scenario. Next, we
consider a “partial CSI” setup where the channel between the transmitters and the eavesdropper
is exponentially distributed and only that channel distribution knowledge is available at the
transmitters. Finally, we solve for the hardest “robust optimization” scenario, where in addition
to the assumption of only channel distribution knowledge about eavesdroppers, we also assume
uncertain channels between the transmitters and the users with exponentially distributed errors.
We develop various path-following procedures of low complexity and rapid convergence for
the optimal power allocation. Our extensive simulation results illustrate their effectiveness and
viability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II, section III and section IV are devoted
to optimizing the links’ worst secrecy throughput and the network secure energy efficiency
under the perfect CSI, partial CSI and imperfectly known CSI, respectively. The simulation is
provided in Section V to show the efficiency of the theoretical developments in the previous
section. Appendices provide fundamental rate outage inequalities and approximations, which are
the mathematical base of the theoretical sections II-IV.
II. INTERFERENCE NETWORKS UNDER PERFECT CSI
We consider a cooperative network consisting of M single-antenna transmitters and M single-
antenna users as depicted in Figure 1, where each transmitter i intends to send the information
si to user i. The information si is normalized, i.e. E(x
2
i ) = 1. Let pi be the transmit power
allocated to transmitter i and p = (p1, . . . ,pM)
T . Furthermore, denote by hji the channel gain
from transmitter j to user i. The received signal at user i is
yi = hiipisi +
M∑
j 6=i
hjipjsj + ni,
where ni ∈ CN (0, σ2i ) is additive noise.
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Fig. 1. System model
Suppose that there is an eavesdropper (EV), which is also equipped with a single antenna.
Denoting by hie the channel gain from transmitter i to the EV, the received signal at the EV is
ye =
M∑
i=1
hiepisi + ne,
where ne ∈ CN (0, σ2e) is additive noise.
Under the perfect CSI at the transmitters, the information throughput at user i is
fi(p) , ln
(
1 +
hiipi∑M
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i
)
. (1)
With the EV considered as part of the legitimate network, the channel gain hie can also be
assumed known [22]. The wiretapped throughput for user i at the EV is
gi(p) , ln
(
1 +
hiepi∑
j 6=i hjepj + σ
2
e
)
. (2)
The secrecy throughput in transmitting information si to user i while keeping it confidential
from the eavesdropper is defined as
max{fi(p)− gi(p), 0}. (3)
5We consider the following fundamental optimization problems in a such network: the maximin
secrecy throughput optimization
max
p
Φsp(p) , min
i=1,...,M
[fi(p)− gi(p)] s.t. (4a)
0 <pi ≤ Pi, i = 1, · · · ,M, (4b)
and the network secure energy efficiency (SEE) maximization under users’ secrecy throughput
quality-of-service (QoS) requirements
max
p
Φee(p) ,
M∑
i=1
[fi(p)− gi(p)]
ζ
M∑
i=1
pi + Pc
s.t. (4b), (5a)
fi(p)− gi(p) ≥ ci, i = 1, ..,M, (5b)
or the maximin transmitter EE optimization under users’ secrecy throughput QoS requirements
max
p
min
i=1,...,M
fi(p)− gi(p)
ζpi + P ic
s.t. (4b), (5b). (6)
Here ζ is the reciprocal of the drain efficiency of the power amplifier, P ic is the circuit power
at transmitter i and Pc =
∑M
i=1 P
i
c . As the numerator in the objective function in (5) is the
sum secrecy throughput while the denominator is the network power consumption, the objective
function in (5) expresses the network SEE in terms of nats/s/Joule. Similarly, each subfunction
in (6) expresses the SEE in for transmitting the information si. Moreover, the constraint (5b) for
given thresholds ci sets the QoS for the users in terms of the secrecy throughput. This constraint
is nonconvex, which is in contrast to the throughput constraint
fi(p) ≥ c˜i, i = 1, . . . ,M,
which is equivalent to the linear constraint
hiipi ≥ (ec˜i − 1)(
∑
j 6=i
hjipj + σ
2
i ), i = 1, . . . ,M.
A popular now approach [23] is to treat fi − gi in (4) as a d.c (difference of two concave
functions) function [24]: fi(p) − gi(p) = f˜i(p) − g˜i(p) with f˜i(p) = ln(
∑M
j=1 hjipj + σ
2
i ) +
ln(
∑M
j 6=i hjepj+σ
2
e) and g˜i(p) = ln(
∑M
j 6=i hjipj+σ
2
i )+ln(
∑M
j=1 hjepj+σ
2
e) which are concave.
Then at each iteration, f˜i is linearized while g˜i is innerly approximated by a concave quadratic
function for a lower approximation of f˜i−g˜i [25], [26]. As a result, each iteration invokes solution
6of a simple convex quadratic optimization problem with the logarithmic function optimization
of high computational complexity avoided.
Our next subsections are devoted to efficient computational approach to solving each of (4),
(5) and (27) without d.c. representation.
A. Max-min secrecy throughput optimization
At every p(κ) ∈ RM+ , applying inequality (74) in the Appendix II for x = 1/hiipi, y =∑M
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i and x¯ = 1/hiip
(κ)
i , y¯ =
∑M
j 6=i hjip
(κ)
j + σ
2
i yields
fi(p) ≥ f (κ)i (p) (7)
for
f
(κ)
i (p) , ln(1 + x
(κ)
i ) +
x
(κ)
i
1 + x
(κ)
i
(
2− p
(κ)
i
pi
−
∑
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i∑M
j 6=i hjip
(κ)
j + σ
2
i
)
. (8)
On the other hand, applying inequality (77) in the Appendix II for x = hiepi, y =
∑M
j 6=i hjepj
and x¯ = hiep
(κ)
i , y¯ =
∑M
j 6=i hjep
(κ)
j yields
gi(p) ≤ g(κ)i (p), (9)
for
g
(κ)
i (p) = ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i ) +
1
1 + x
(κ)
e,i
(
0.5hie(p
2
i /p
(κ)
i + p
(κ)
i )∑M
j 6=i hjepj + σ
2
e
− x(κ)e,i
)
. (10)
Initialized by a feasible p(0) for the convex constraint (4b), at the κ-th iteration we solve the
convex optimization problem
max
p
Φ(κ)
sp
(p) , min
i=1,...,M
[f
(κ)
i (p)− g(κ)i (p)] s.t. (4b) (11)
to generate the next iterative point p(κ+1).
One can see that Φsp(p) ≥ F (κ)sp (p) ∀ p and Φsp(p(κ)) = F (κ)sp (p(κ)). Futhermore, Φ(κ)sp (p(κ+1)) >
Φ
(κ)
sp (p(κ)) if p(κ+1) 6= p(κ) because the former is the optimal solution of (11) while the latter is
its feasible point. Therefore,
Φsp(p
(κ+1)) ≥ Φ(κ)
sp
(p(κ+1)) > Φ(κ)
sp
(p(κ)) = Φsp(p
(κ)), (12)
i.e. p(κ+1) is better than p(κ); as such {p(κ)} is a sequence of improved points that converges at
least to a locally optimal solution of (4) satisfying the first order necessary optimality condition
[27, Prop. 1]. In summary, we propose in Algorithm 1 a path-following computational procedure
for the maximin secrecy throughput optimization problem (4).
7Algorithm 1 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy throughput optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point p(0) for the convex constraints (4b).
Calculate R
(0)
min as the value of the objective in (4) at p
(0).
repeat
• Set κ = κ + 1.
• Solve the convex optimization problem (11) to obtain the solution p(κ).
• Calculate R(κ)min as the value of the objective in (4) at p(κ).
until
R
(κ)
min−R
(κ−1)
min )
R
(κ−1)
min
≤ ǫtol.
B. Secure energy efficient maximization
Define
π(p) = ζ
M∑
i=1
pi + Pc.
Applying the inequality (75) in Appendix II for x = 1/hiipi, y =
∑M
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i , t = π(p),
and x¯ = 1/hiip
(κ)
i , y¯ =
∑M
j 6=i hjip
(κ)
j + σ
2
i , t¯ = π(p
(κ)) yields
fi(p)
π(p)
≥ F (κ)i (p) (13)
for
F
(κ)
i (p) ,
2 ln(1 + x
(κ)
i )
π(p(κ))
+
x
(κ)
i
π(p(κ))(1 + x
(κ)
i )
(
2− p
(κ)
i
pi
−
∑
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i∑M
j 6=i hjip
(κ)
j + σ
2
i
)
− ln(1 + x
(κ)
i )
π2(p(κ))
π(p). (14)
On the other hand, applying inequality (77) in Appendix II for α = 1+ln(2), x = hiepi/(
∑
j 6=i hjepj+
σ2e), t = π(p) and x¯ , hiep
(κ)
i /(
∑
j 6=i hjep
(κ)
j + σ
2
e), t¯ = π(p
(κ)) yields
−gi(p)
π(p)
≥ 2α− ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )
π(p(κ))
+
x
(κ)
e,i
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )π(p
(κ))
− 1
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )π(p
(κ))
hiepi∑
j 6=i hjepj + σ
2
e
−α− ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )
π2(p(κ))
π(p)− α
π(p)
(15)
which together with (78) in Appendix II yield
fi(p)− gi(p)
π(p)
≥ G(κ)i (p) (16)
8for the concave function
G
(κ)
i (p) , 2
α− ln(1 + x(κ)e,i )
π(p(κ))
+
x
(κ)
e,i
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )π(p
(κ))
− 1
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )π(p
(κ))
0.5hie(p
2
i /p
(κ)
i + p
(κ)
i )∑
j 6=i hjepj + σ
2
e
−α− ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )
π2(p(κ))
π(p)− α
π(p)
. (17)
Initialized by a feasible point p(0) for (5), we solve the following convex optimization problem
at the κ-th iteration to generate the next iterative point p(κ+1):
max
p
Φ(κ)
ee
(p) ,
M∑
i=1
[F
(κ)
i (p) +G
(κ)
i (p)] s.t. (4b), (18a)
f
(κ)
i (p)− g(κ)i (p) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M. (18b)
Due to (7) and (9), the nonconvex constraint (5b) in (5) is implied by the convex constraint (18b)
in (18). Similarly to (12), we can show that Φee(p
(κ+1)) > Φee(p
(κ)) whenever p(κ+1) 6= p(κ);
as such the computational procedure that invokes the convex program (18) to generate the next
iterative point, is path-following for (5), which at least converges to its locally optimal solution
satisfying the Karush-Kuh-Tucker (KKT) conditions of optimality.
Recalling the definition (9) and (10) of functions f
(κ)
i and g
(κ)
i , initialized by any feasible point
p˜0) for the convex constraint (4b), we generate p˜(κ+1), κ = 0, . . . , as the optimal solution of the
convex optimization problem
max
p
min
i=1,...,M
f
(κ)
i (p)− g(κ)i (p)
ci
s.t. (4b) (19)
until p˜(κ+1) such that mini=1,...,M(fi(p
(κ+1))− gi(p(κ+1))/ci ≥ 1 is found and thus p(0) = p˜(κ+1)
is feasible for (5) that is needed for the initial step.
Analogously, to address the maximin secure energy efficient optimization problem (27) define
πi(pi) = ζpi + P
i
c .
Similarly to (13) and (16) the following inequalities can be obtained:
fi(p)
πi(pi)
≥ F˜ (κ)i (pi) (20)
−gi(p)
πi(pi)
≥ G˜(κ)i (pi) (21)
9for
F˜
(κ)
i (pi) ,
2 ln(1 + x
(κ)
i )
πi(p
(κ)
i )
+
x
(κ)
i
πi(p
(κ)
i )(1 + x
(κ)
i )
(
2− p
(κ)
i
pi
−
∑
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i∑M
j 6=i hjip
(κ)
j + σ
2
i
)
− ln(1 + x
(κ)
i )
π2i (p
(κ)
i )
πi(pi) (22)
G˜
(κ)
i (pi) , 2
α− ln(1 + x(κ)e,i )
πi(p
(κ)
i )
+
x
(κ)
e,i
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )πi(p
(κ)
i )
− 1
(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )πi(p
(κ)
i )
0.5hie(p
2
i /p
(κ)
i + p
(κ)
i )∑
j 6=i hjepj + σ
2
e
−α − ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i )
π2i (p
(κ)
i )
πi(pi)− α
πi(pi)
. (23)
Initialized a feasible point p(0) for (27), which is found by using the generation (19), the following
convex optimization problem at the κ-th iteration is proposed to generate the next iterative point
p(κ+1):
max
p
min
i=1,...,M
[F˜
(κ)
i (p) + G˜
(κ)
i (p)] s.t. (4b), f
(κ)
i (p)− g(κ)i (p) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M. (24)
The computational procedure that invokes the convex program (24) to generate the next iterative
point, is path-following for (27), which at least converges to its locally optimal solution satisfying
the first order necessary optimality condition.
III. INTERFERENCE NETWORKS UNDER PARTIAL WIRETAP CSI
When the EV is not part of the legitimate network, it is almost impossible to estimate
channels hie from the transmitters to it. It is common to assume that hie ∼ h¯ieχie, where
χie is an exponential distribution with the unit mean and h¯ie is a known deterministic quantity.
Accordingly, instead of (2), the wiretapped throughput for user i at the EV is defined via the
following throughput outage [28]–[32]:
gi,o(p) , max {ln(1 + ri) : Prob
(
hiepi∑
j 6=i hjepj + σ
2
e
< ri
)
≤ ǫEV } (25)
for ǫEV > 0. Using (65) in Appendix I, it follows that
gi,o(p) = ln(1 + ri)
where
pih¯ie ln(1− ǫEV ) + riσ2epih¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jepj
h¯iepi
)
= 0, i = 1, ...,M. (26)
10
Therefore, the problem of maximin secrecy throughput optimization can be formulated as
max
p,r
min
i=1,...,M
[fi(p)− ln(1 + ri)] s.t (4b), (26), (27a)
ri > 0, i = 1, ...,M. (27b)
The following result unravels the computationally intractable nonlinear equality constraints in
(26).
Proposition 1: The problem (27) is equivalent to the following problem
max
p,r
min
i=1,...,M
[fi(p)− ln(1 + ri)] s.t (4b), (27b), (28a)
pih¯ie ln(1− ǫEV ) + riσ2e + pih¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jepj
h¯iepi
)
≥0, i = 1, ...,M. (28b)
Proof: Since the equality constraint (26) implies the inequality constraint (28b), it is true that
max (27) ≤ max (28).
We now show that there is an optimal solution of (28) satisfies the equality constraint (26) and
thus
max (28) ≤ max (27),
showing the equivalence between (28) and (27). Indeed, suppose that at the optimality,
pih¯ie ln(1− ǫEV ) + riσ2e + pih¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jepj
h¯iepi
)
> 0
for some i = 1, . . . ,M . Then there is 0 < γi < 1 such that
pih¯ie ln(1− ǫEV ) + (γri)σ2e + pih¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
γrih¯jepj
h¯iepi
)
= 0,
that yields
fi(p)− ln(1 + γri) > fi(p)− ln(1 + ri),
so γiri is also the optimal solution of (28), which satisfies the equality constraint (26). 
To address problem (28), note that a lower bounding function for the first term in (28a) is
f
(κ)
i (p) defined by (8), while an upper bounding function for the second term in (28a) is the
following linear function
a
(κ)
i (ri) = ln(1 + r
(κ)
i )−
r
(κ)
i
r
(κ)
i + 1
+
ri
r
(κ)
i + 1
. (29)
11
The main difficulty now is to develop a lower bounding approximation for the function in the left
hand side (LHS) of constraint (28b). Applying inequality (74) in Appendix II for x = 1/rih¯jepj ,
y = h¯iepi and x¯ = 1/r
(κ)
i h¯jep
(κ)
j , y¯ = h¯iep
(κ)
i yields
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jepj
h¯iepi
)
≥ λ(κ)ij (ri, pj , pi) (30)
for
λ
(κ)
ij (ri, pj, pi) , ln(1 + x
(κ)
ij ) + y
(κ)
ij
(
2− r
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
ripj
− pi
p
(κ)
i
)
(31)
with x
(κ)
ij , r
(κ)
i h¯jep
(κ)
j /h¯iep
(κ)
i and y
(κ)
ij , x
(κ)
ij /(x
(κ)
ij + 1). Therefore, over the trust region
λ
(κ)
ij (ri, pj, pi) ≥ 0,
2.5− ri
r
(κ)
i
− pj
p
(κ)
j
≥ 0 (32)
it is true that
pi ln(1 +
rih¯jepj
h¯iepi
) ≥ pi ln(1 + x(κ)ij ) + y(κ)ij
(
2pi −
r
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j pi
ripj
− p
2
i
p
(κ)
i
)
=
(
ln(1 + x
(κ)
ij ) + 2y
(κ)
ij
)
pi − 0.5y(κ)ij
[
2
p2i
p
(κ)
i
+(
√
2pi√
p
(κ)
i
+
√
p
(κ)
i r
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j√
2ripj
)2 − 2p
2
i
p
(κ)
i
− p
(κ)
i (r
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j )
2
2r2ip
2
j


≥ Λ(κ)i (ri,pj ,pi) (33)
for
Λ
(κ)
i (ri,pj ,pi) =
(
ln(1 + x
(κ)
ij ) + 2y
(κ)
ij
)
pi − 0.5y(κ)i

√2pi√
p
(κ)
i
+
√
p
(κ)
i r
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j√
2ripj


2
−0.5y(κ)i p(κ)i
(
ri
r
(κ)
i
+
pj
p
(κ)
j
− 2.5
)
.
Note that in obtaining (33) we also used the fact that function ν(ri,pj) , 1/r
2
ip
2
j is convex in the
domain {ri > 0,pj > 0} and accordingly [24] 1/r2ip2j ≥ ν(r(κ)i , p(κ)j )+〈∇ν(r(κ)i , p(κ)j ), (ri,pj)−
(r
(κ)
i , p
(κ)
j )〉 = [5− 2(ri/r(κ)i + pj/p(κ)j )]/(r(κ)i p(κ)j )2.
12
Initialized from a feasible point (p(0), r(0)) for (28) we solve the following convex program
at the κ-th iteration to generate (p(κ+1), r
(κ+1)
u ):
max
w,r
min
i=1,...,M
[f
(κ)
i (p)− a(κ)i (ri)] s.t (4b), (27b), (32), (34a)
pih¯ie ln(1− ǫEV ) + σ2eri + h¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
Λ
(κ)
ij (ri, pj , pi)≥0, i = 1, ...,M. (34b)
Then r
(κ+1)
i is found from solving
ψi(ri) , p
(κ+1)
i h¯ie ln(1− ǫEV ) + riσ2e + p(κ+1)i h¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jep
(κ+1)
j
h¯iep
(κ+1)
i
)
= 0, (35)
i = 1, ...,M,
by bisection on [0, r
(κ+1)
u,i ] such that
0 ≤ ψi(r(κ+1)i ) ≤ ǫb (tolerance). (36)
A bisection on [rl, ru] for solving ψi(ri) = 0 where ψi increases in ri > 0 is implemented as
follows:
• Define ri = (rl + ru)/2. Reset rl = ri if ψi(ri) < 0. Otherwise reset ru = ri.
• Terminate until 0 ≤ ψi(ri) ≤ ǫb.
In summary, we propose in Algorithm 2 a path-following computational procedure for the
maximin secrecy throughput optimization problem (28), which at least converges to its locally
optimal solution satisfying the first order necessary optimality condition.
Algorithm 2 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy throughput optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point (p(0), r(0)) for (28) and calculate
R
(0)
min as the value of the objective function in (28) at (p
(0), r(0)).
repeat
• Set κ = κ + 1.
• Solve the convex optimization problem (34) to obtain the solution (p(κ), r(κ)u ).
• Solve the nonlinear equations (35) to obtain the roots r(κ)i .
• Calculate R(κ)min as the value of the objective function in (28) at (p(κ), r(κ)).
until
R
(κ)
min−R
(κ−1)
min )
R
(κ−1)
min
≤ ǫtol.
13
A feasible (p(0), r(0)) is found as follows: taking p(0) feasible to the power constraint (4b) and
finding r(0) from solving
ψi(ri) , p
(0)
i h¯ie ln(1− ǫEV ) + riσ2e + h¯iep(0)i
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jep
(0)
j
h¯iep
(0)
i
)
= 0, i = 1, ...,M,
by bisection on [0, r
(0)
u,i ] with ψi(ru,i) > 0. Such r
(0)
u,i can be easily found: from any ru,i > 0,
if ψi(ru,i) ≥ 0 then we are done. Otherwise reset ru,i ← 2ru,i and check ψi(ru,i). Stop when
ψ(ru,i) > 0. Intuitively, taking r
(0)
u,i = h¯iep
(0)
i /σ
2
e will work.
Furthermore, the problem of SEE maximization can be formulated as
max
p,r
∑M
i=1 (fi(p)− ln(1 + ri))
π(p)
s.t (4b), (27b), (28b) (37a)
fi(p)− ln(1 + ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M. (37b)
Using the inequality (76) in Appendix II leads to
− ln(1 + ri)
π(p)
≥ a˜(κ)i (ri,p)
for
a˜
(κ)
i (ri,p) , 2
α− ln(1 + r(κ)i )
π(p(κ))
+
r
(κ)
i
π(p(κ))(1 + r
(κ)
i )
− ri
π(p(κ))(1 + r
(κ)
i )
−α− ln(1 + r
(κ)
i )
π2(p(κ))
π(p)− α
π(p)
. (38)
Initialized by a feasible (p(0), r(0)), the following convex programm is solved to generate (p(κ+1), r(κ+1))
at the κiteration:
max
p,r
M∑
i=1
[F
(κ)
i (p) + a˜
(κ)
i (ri,p)] s.t (4b), (27b), (32), (34b), (39a)
f
(κ)
i (p)− a(κ)i (ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M. (39b)
It can be shown that the computational procedure that invokes the convex program (39) to
generate the next iterative point, is path-following for (37), which at least converges to its
locally optimal solution satisfying the KKT conditions.
A point (p(0), r(0)) is feasible for (37) if and only if mini=1,...,M [fi(p
(0)) − ln(1 + r(0)i )]/ci ≥ 1
and thus can be easily located by adapting Algorithm 2.
Similarly, a path-following procedure for the following maximin SEE optimization problem
can be proposed
max
p,r
min
i=1,...,M
fi(p)− ln(1 + ri)
πi(p)
s.t (4b), (27b), (28b), (37b). (40)
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IV. ROBUST OPTIMIZATION
Beside assuming that hie ∼ h¯ieχie with an exponential distribution χie with the unit mean
and deterministic hie, we also assume that CSI of hji is not known perfectly in the form hji =
h¯ji(1+ δχji) with deterministic h¯ji and δ, and random χji, which is an independent exponential
distribution of the unit mean, and hie ∼ h¯ieχie with exponential distributions χji and χie of the
unit mean. Instead of (1), the throughput at user i is defined via the following outage probability
fi,o(p) , max{ln(1 +Ri) : Prob
(
hiipi∑M
j 6=i hjipj + σ
2
i
< Ri
)
≤ ǫc} (41)
for 0 < ǫc << 1.
Using (69) in Appendix II, it follows that
fi,o(p) = ln(1 +Ri), i = 1, . . . ,M, (42)
where
pih¯ii[δ ln(1− ǫc)− 1] +Ri(σ2i +
∑
j 6=i
h¯jipj) + δh¯iipi
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRipj
h¯iipi
)
= 0, (43)
i = 1, . . . ,M.
Therefore, the problem of maximin secrecy throughput robust optimization is defined by
max
p,R,r
min
i=1,...,M
[ln(1 +Ri)− ln(1 + ri)] s.t (4b), (27b), (28b), (43), (44a)
Ri > 0, i = 1, ...,M. (44b)
The following result unravels the computationally intractable nonlinear equality constraints in
(43):
Proposition 2: Problem (44) is equivalent to the following problem
max
p,R,r
min
i=1,...,M
[ln(1 +Ri)− ln(1 + ri)] s.t (4b), (28b), (27b), (44b) (45a)
pih¯ii[δ ln(1− ǫc)− 1] +Ri(σ2i +
∑
j 6=i
h¯jipj) + δh¯iipi
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRipj
h¯iipi
)
≤ 0, (45b)
i = 1, ...,M.
Proof: Again, it is obvious that
max (44) ≤ (45).
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Furthermore, at an optimal solution of (45), if
pih¯ii[δ ln(1− ǫc)− 1] +Ri(σ2i +
∑
j 6=i
h¯jipj) + δh¯iipi
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRipj
h¯iipi
)
< 0,
for some i then there is γ > 1 such that
pih¯ii[δ ln(1− ǫc)− 1] + (γRi)(σ2i +
∑
j 6=i
h¯jipj) + δh¯iipi
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯ji(γRi)pj
h¯iipi
)
= 0,
which results in ln(1 + γRi) > ln(1 + Ri), implying that γRi is also an optimal solution of
(45). We thus have proved that there is always an optimal solution of (45) to satisfy the equality
constraints in (43), so
max (45) ≤ (44),
completing the proof of Proposition 2. 
To address problem (45), firstly we provide a lower bounding approximation for the first term
in the objective function in (45a) as follows
ln(1 +Ri) ≥ A(κ)i (Ri) , ln(1 +R(κ)i ) +
R
(κ)
i
R
(κ)
i + 1
− (R
(κ)
i )
2
R
(κ)
i + 1
1
Ri
.
Next, to obtain an upper bounding approximation for the function in the left hand side of (45b)
and thus to provide an inner approximation for constraint (45b), we use the following inequality
Ripj = 0.5(Ri + pj)
2 − 0.5R2i − 0.5p2j
≤ Υ(κ)ij (Ri, pj)
, 0.5(Ri + pj)
2 − R(κ)i Ri + 0.5(R(κ)i )2 − p(κ)j pj + 0.5(p(κ)j )2, (46)
over the trust region
2Ri ≥ R(κ)i , 2pj ≥ p(κ)j . (47)
Then
pi ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRipj
h¯iipi
)
≤ pi

ln
(
1 +
h¯jiR
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
h¯iip
(κ)
i
)
+
1
h¯ii
h¯ji
+
R
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
p
(κ)
i
(
Ripj
pi
− R
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
p
(κ)
i
)


≤ Φ(κ)ij (Ri, pj, pi)
, pi ln
(
1 +
h¯jiR
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
h¯iip
(κ)
i
)
(48)
+
1
h¯ii
h¯ji
+
R
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
p
(κ)
i
(
Υ
(κ)
ij (Ri, pj)−
R
(κ)
i p
(κ)
j
p
(κ)
i
pi
)
. (49)
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Initialized from a feasible (p(0), R(0), r(0)) for (45) we solve the following convex program at
the κ-th iteration to generate the next iterative point (p(κ+1), R
(κ+1)
l , r
(κ+1)
u ):
max
w,r
min
i=1,...,M
[A
(κ)
i (Ri)− a(κ)i (ri)] s.t (4b), (27b), (32), (34b), (44b), (47) (50a)
pih¯ii [δ ln(1− ǫc)− 1] + σ2iRi +
∑
j 6=i
h¯jiΥ
(κ)
ij (Ri,pj) + δh¯ii
M∑
j 6=i
Φ
(κ)
ij (Ri, pj, pi) ≤ 0, (50b)
i = 1, ...,M.
At the same κ-th iteration, r
(κ+1)
i is found from solving (35) by bisection on [0, r
(κ+1)
u,i ] such that
(36), while R
(κ+1)
i is found from solving
ζi(Ri) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,M, (51)
for the increasing function
ζi(Ri) , δ ln(1− ǫc)− 1 +
Ri(σ
2
i +
∑
j 6=i h¯jip
(κ+1)
j )
h¯iip
(κ+1)
i
+ δ
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRip
(κ+1)
j
h¯iip
(κ+1)
i
)
,
by bisection on [R
(κ+1)
l,i , Ru,i] with ζi(Ru,i) > 0 such that
− ǫb ≤ gi(R(κ+1)i ) ≤ 0. (52)
Ru,i can be easily located: initialized by Ri = 2R
(κ+1)
l,i and check ζi(Ri). If ζi(Ri) > 0 then we
are done. Otherwise reset Ri ← 2Ri until ζi(Ri) > 0. Intuitively, taking Ru,i = 2h¯iip(κ+1)i /(σ2i +∑
j 6=i h¯jip
(κ+1)
j ) will work.
In summary, we propose in Algorithm 3 a path-following computational procedure for the
maximin secrecy throughput optimization problem (45), which at least converges to its locally
optimal solution satisfying the first order necessary optimality condition.
An initial feasible (p(0), R(0), r(0)) can be easily found as follows: taking any p(0) feasible to
the power constraint (4b) to find R(0) and r(0) from solving
ζi(Ri) , δ ln(1− ǫc)− 1 +
Ri(σ
2
i +
∑
j 6=i h¯jip
(0)
j )
h¯iip
(0)
i
+ δ
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
h¯jiRip
(0)
j
h¯iip
(0)
i
)
= 0,
i = 1, ...,M,
by bisection on [0, 2h¯iip
(0)
i /(σ
2
i +
∑
j 6=i h¯jip
(0)
j )], and r
(0) is found from solving
ln(1− ǫc) + riσ
2
e
h¯iep
(0)
i
+
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯jep
(0)
j
h¯iep
(0)
i
)
= 0, i = 1, ...,M,
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Algorithm 3 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy throughput optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point (p(0), R(0), r(0)) for (45) and calculate
R
(0)
min as the value of the objective function in (45) at (p
(0), R(0), r(0)).
repeat
• Set κ = κ + 1.
• Solve the convex optimization problem (50) to obtain the solution (p(κ), R(κ)l , r(κ)u ).
• Solve the nonlinear equations (35) to obtain the roots r(κ)i .
• Solve the nonlinear equations (51) to obtain the roots R(κ)i .
• Calculate R(κ)min as the value of the objective function in (45) at (p(κ), R(κ), r(κ)).
until
R
(κ)
min−R
(κ−1)
min )
R
(κ−1)
min
≤ ǫtol.
by bisection on [0, h¯iep
(0)
i /σ
2
e ].
Lastly, the network secure energy efficiency problem is now formulated by
max
p,R,r
∑M
i=1(ln(1 +Ri)− ln(1 + ri))
π(p)
s.t (4b), (27b), (28b), (43), (44b), (53a)
ln(1 +Ri)− ln(1 + ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M. (53b)
To this end, we use inequality (75) in Appendix II to obtain
ln(1 +Ri)
π(p)
≥ A˜(κ)i (Ri,p)
,
2 ln(1 +R
(κ)
i )
π(p(κ))
+
R
(κ)
i
π(p(κ))(1 +R
(κ)
i )
(
1− R
(κ)
i
Ri
)
− ln(1 +R
(κ)
i )
π2(p(κ))
π(p) (54)
Initialized by a feasible point (R(0), r(0), p(0)), at the κ-th iteration, the following convex pro-
gramm is solved to generated (R(κ+1), r(κ+1), p(κ1))
max
w,r
M∑
i=1
[
A˜
(κ)
i (Ri,p) + a˜
(κ)
i (ri,p)
]
s.t (4b), (27b), (32), (34b), (44b), (47), (50b), (55a)
A
(κ)
i (Ri)− a(κ)i (ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, ...,M. (55b)
It can be shown that the computational procedure that invokes the convex program (55) to
generate the next iterative point, is path-following for (53), which at least converges to its
locally optimal solution satisfying the KKT conditions.
A point (p(0), R(0), r(0)) is feasible for (53) if and only ifmini=1,...,M [fi(R
(0)
i )−ln(1+r(0)i )]/ci ≥ 1
and thus can be easily located by adapting Algorithm 3.
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Fig. 2. Min secrecy throughput among users versus the transmit power budget
Similarly, a path-following procedure for the following maximin SEE optimization problem
can be proposed
max
p,r
min
i=1,...,M
fi(Ri)− ln(1 + ri)
πi(p)
s.t (4b), (27b), (28b), (43), (44b), (53b). (56)
V. SIMULATION
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed algorithms through extensive simula-
tion. Considered in all simulation studies is a wireless network with M = 10 transmitter-user
communication pairs and noise variance σ2i = σ
2
e = 1 mW [33]. All channels among each pair
are i.i.d. complex normal random variable with zero mean and unit variance. The drain efficiency
of power amplifier 1/ζ is set to be 40% and the circuit power of each transmitter is P ic = 5
mW. Besides, we set ǫc = 0.1 and ǫEV ∈ {0.1, 0.6} and δ = 0.1. The computation tolerance for
terminating all proposed Algorithms is ǫtol = 10
−4.
A. Maximin secrecy throughput optimization
This subsection analyzes the secrecy throughput in the presence of eavesdropper. In what
follows, we consider five cases, including “Perfect CSI”, “Partial CSI (ǫEV = 0.1)”, “Partial CSI
(ǫEV = 0.6)”, “Robust Opt. (ǫEV = 0.1 ǫc = 0.1)” and “Robust Opt. (ǫEV = 0.6 ǫc = 0.1)”.
The terms “Perfect CSI”, “Partial CSI” and “Robust Opt.” correspond to the scenarios discussed
in Sections III, IV and V, respectively. Fig. 2 plots the minimum secrecy throughput versus the
transmit power budget Pi varying from 10 to 50 mW. As expected, it is seen that the secrecy
19
TABLE I
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR MAXIMIN SECRECY THROUGHPUT OPTIMIZATION.
Pi (mW) 10 20 30 40 50
Perfect CSI 8.12 7.63 7.61 7.71 8.56
Partial CSI (ǫEV = 0.1) 11.25 10.87 10.73 10.40 10.31
Partial CSI (ǫEV = 0.6) 13.12 12.18 14.92 12.60 11.68
Robust Opt. (ǫEV = 0.1) 4.20 4.33 4.20 3.52 3.35
Robust Opt. (ǫEV = 0.6) 5.18 4.96 4.82 4.14 4.90
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Fig. 3. Energy efficiency versus QoS constraint
throughput increase with the transmitted power budget Pi. It is also observed that the secrecy
throughput of “Partial CSI” with ǫEV = 0.1 is always better than the secrecy throughputs of
others. For ǫEV = 0.1, “Partial CSI” and “Robust Opt.” clearly and significantly outperform
“Perfect CSI”. However, the secrecy throughput of “Perfect CSI” is superior to the secrecy
throughputs of “Partial CSI” and “Robust Opt.” with ǫEV = 0.6. This is not a surprise because
according to the wiretapped throughput defined by (2) and the throughput outage defined by
(25)-(26), the former is seen higher than the later for small ǫEV .
Table I provides the average number of iterations required to solve maximin secrecy throughput
optimization for the above three cases. As can be observed, our proposed algorithm converges
in less than 14 iterations, on average, for all considered cases.
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Fig. 5. Total power consumption versus QoS constraint
TABLE II
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY MAXIMIZATION.
ci (bps/Hz) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Perfect CSI 32.21 29.62 24.26 21.23 15.33
Partial CSI (ǫEV = 0.1) 33.73 33.12 28.75 25.74 23.25
Partial CSI (ǫEV = 0.6) 35.82 30.56 34.22 22.26 18.34
Robust Opt. (ǫEV = 0.1) 24.25 27.41 25.53 30.06 31.75
Robust Opt. (ǫEV = 0.6) 29.02 23.76 26.80 29.32 23.46
B. Energy efficiency maximization
In this subsection, we first examine the performance of EE maximization algorithm versus the
QoS constraint. The transmitted power Pi is fixed at 20 mW and QoS constraint ci varies from
0.1 to 0.5 bps/Hz. It can be observed from Fig. 3 that the EE performance degrades as the QoS
constraint ci increases. Moreover, “Partial CSI” with ǫEV = 0.1 outperforms others in terms of
EE performance. To find out the impact on the sum throughput and total power consumption
in EE maximization algorithm, the achieved sum throughput and the total power consumed
are illustrated in Fig. 4 and 5, respectively. It can be seen that the total power consumption
increases faster than the sum throughput, which explains why EE degrades as ci increases in
Fig. 3. Although the sum throughput of “Robust Opt.” is slightly better than “Partial CSI”,
“Partial CSI” consumes less power than “Robust Opt.”. Table II shows that our proposed EE
maximization algorithm converges in less than 35 iterations, on average, in all considered cases.
21
10 20 30 40 50
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
Pi (mW)
En
er
gy
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 (b
its
/J/
Hz
)
 
 
Perfect CSI
Partial CSI (ε
EV=0.1)
Partial CSI (ε
EV=0.6)
Robust Opt.(ε
EV=0.1)
Robust Opt.(ε
EV=0.6)
Fig. 6. Energy efficiency versus the transmit power budget
10 20 30 40 50
6.95
7
7.05
7.1
7.15
7.2
7.25
7.3
7.35
7.4
Pi (mW)
Su
m
 th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (b
ps
/H
z)
 
 
Perfect CSI
Partial CSI (ε
EV=0.1)
Partial CSI (ε
EV=0.6)
Robust Opt.(ε
EV=0.1)
Robust Opt.(ε
EV=0.6)
Fig. 7. Sum throughput versus the transmit power budget
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Fig. 8. Total power consumption versus the transmit power
budget
Next, we further investigate the performance of EE versus the transmit power budget. The
QoS constraint ci is fixed at 0.4 bps/Hz and Pi varies from 10 to 50 mW. As shown in
Fig. 6, we observe that the EE performance of “Partial CSI” with ǫEV = 0.1 clearly and
significantly outperforms the optimized EE of other cases. Furthermore, it can be seen that
the EE performances saturate when the transmit power budget exceeds the threshold. That is
because for small transmit power budget, the denominator of EE is dominated by the circuit
power and the EE is maximized by maximization of the sum throughput in the numerator.
However, for larger transmit power budget, the denominator of EE is dominated by the actual
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Fig. 10. Throughput versus the QoS constraint
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Fig. 11. Power consumption versus the QoS constraint
transmit power. When the total power consumption saturates in Fig. 8, both the EE and the sum
throughput accordingly saturate in Figs. 6 and 7.
C. Maxmin energy efficiency optimization
In this subsection, we aim to maximize the minimum EE performance. Firstly, Fig. 9 plots the
maximized minimum EE versus QoS constraint. The transmitted power Pi is fixed at 20 mW and
QoS constraint ci varies from 0.1 to 0.5 bps/Hz. It can be seen that the optimized minimum EE
decreases with increasing ci and the EE performance of “Partial CSI” with ǫEV = 0.1 is always
better than the optimized EE of other cases. Furthermore, it is also observed that for ǫEV = 0.1
“Partial CSI” and “Robust Opt.” outperform “Perfect CSI” in terms of EE performance, while
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TABLE III
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR MAXIMIN ENERGY EFFICIENCY OPTIMIZATION.
ci (bps/Hz) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Perfect CSI 32.42 30.35 31.61 29.23 22.25
Partial CSI (ǫEV = 0.1) 21.86 22.13 20.42 20.82 30.23
Partial CSI (ǫEV = 0.6) 23.66 25.02 22.68 33.30 29.34
Robust Opt. (ǫEV = 0.1) 16.05 23.27 23.36 31.15 18.62
Robust Opt. (ǫEV = 0.6) 20.78 26.12 31.24 27.46 23.92
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Fig. 12. Minimum energy efficiency versus the transmit power budget
“Perfect CSI” is superior to “Partial CSI” and “Robust Opt.” for ǫEV = 0.6. The corresponding
throughput and power consumption are plotted in Fig. 10 and 11, respectively. Table III shows
that maximin EE optimization converges in less than 33 iterations, on average, in all considered
cases.
Next, we investigate the maximin EE performance versus the transmit power budget. The
QoS constraint ci is fixed at 0.4 bps/Hz and Pi varies from 10 to 50 mW. The minimum EE
performance versus the transmit power budget is illustrated in Fig. 12. Again, we observe that the
optimized minimum EE saturates when the transmit power is larger than some threshold. This is
due to the fact that under small transmit power regime, the EE is maximized by maximizing the
throughput in the numerator. When the transmit power is large enough to obtain the optimized
EE, both throughput and power consumption accordingly saturate in Figs. 13 and 14.
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Fig. 13. Throughput versus the transmit power budget
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the problem of power allocation to maximize the worst links’s secrecy
throughput or the network’s secure energy efficiency under various scenarios of available channel
state information. We have further proposed path-following algorithms tailored for each of the
considered scenarios. Finally, we have provided simulations to show the efficiency of the pro-
posed algorithms. Extensions to beamforming in multi-input single-output (MISO) interference
networks are under current investigation.
APPENDIX I: OUTAGE PROBABILITY FUNDAMENTAL
Recall a probability distribution χ is called an exponential distribution if its probability density
function (pdf) is in form λe−λx with λ > 0. It is immediate to check that Prob(χ ≥ t) = e−λt
and E[χ] = 1/λ. Recall the following result [28, (15)].
Theorem 1: Suppose z1, · · · , zn are independent exponentially distributed random variables
with E(zi) = 1/λi. Then for deterministic pi > 0, i = 1, · · · , n:
Prob(p1z1 ≤
n∑
i=2
pizi) = 1−
n∏
i=2
1
1 + (λ1/p1)/(λi/pi)
. (57)
It follows from (57) that
Prob(p1z1 > c+
n∑
i=2
pizi) = e
−λ1c/p1
n∏
i=2
1
1 + (λ1/p1)/(λi/pi)
(58)
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and
Prob(
p1z1
n∑
i=2
pizi + σ
> γ) = Prob(p1z1 >
n∑
i=2
γpizi + γσ) (59)
= e−λ1γσ/p1
n∏
i=2
1
1 + γ(λ1/p1)/(λi/pi)
(60)
Sometimes, it is also more convenient to write (57), (58) and (60) in terms of means λ¯i = 1/λi
of zi as
Prob(p1z1 ≤
n∑
i=2
pizi) = 1−
n∏
i=2
p1λ¯1
p1λ¯1 + piλi
, (61)
Prob(p1z1 > c +
n∑
i=2
pizi) = e
−c/p1λ¯1
n∏
i=2
p1λ¯1
p1λ¯1 + piλ¯i
, (62)
Prob(
p1z1∑n
i=2 pizi + σ
> γ) = e−γσ/p1λ¯1
n∏
i=2
p1λ¯1
p1λ¯1 + γpiλ¯i
(63)
Theorem 2: For given ε > 0, define
rmax , max{r : Prob( p1z1∑n
i=2 pizi + σ
2
) < r) ≤ ε} (64)
Then rmax is the unique positive root of the nonlinear equation
ln(1− ε) + rσ
2
p1λ¯1
+
n∑
i=2
ln(1 +
rpiλ¯i
p1λ¯1
) = 0. (65)
Proof: Applying (62) yields
Prob(
p1z1∑n
i=2 pizi + σ
2
< r) = Prob(p1z1 < r(
n∑
i=2
pizi + σ
2))
= 1− e−rσ2/p1λ¯1
n∏
i=2
p1λ¯1
p1λ¯1 + rpiλ¯i
. (66)
Therefore,
Prob(
p1z1∑n
i=2 pizi + σ
2
) < r) ≤ ε ⇔ 1− e−rσ2/p1λ¯1
n∏
i=2
p1λ¯1
p1λ¯1 + rpiλ¯i
≤ ε
⇔ ln(1− ε) + rσ
2
p1λ¯1
+
n∑
i=2
ln(1 +
rpiλ¯i
p1λ¯1
) ≤ 0. (67)
By noticing that the function in the left hand side (LHS) of (67) is increasing in r, we arrive at
(65). 
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Theorem 3: Suppose z¯i > 0, pi > 0, δ > 0 and σ > 0 are deterministic values, while z˜i are
independent exponential distributions. For ε > 0, define
rp , max {r : Prob( p1z¯1(1 + δz˜1)∑n
i=2 piz¯i(1 + δz˜i) + σ
2
< r) ≤ ε}. (68)
Then rp is the unique positive root of the nonlinear equation
δ ln(1− ε) + r(σ
2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i)− p1z¯1
z¯1p1
+ δ
n∑
i=2
ln(1 +
rz¯ipi
z¯1p1
) = 0. (69)
Proof: Using (67) yields
Prob(
p1z¯1(1 + δz˜1)∑n
i=2 piz¯i(1 + δz˜i) + σ
2
< r) ≤ ε ⇔
ln(1− ε) + r(σ
2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i)− p1z¯1
z¯1p1δ
+
n∑
i=2
ln(1 +
rz¯ipi
z¯1p1
) ≤ 0 ⇔ (70)
δ ln(1− ε) + r(σ
2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i)− p1z¯1
z¯1p1
+ δ
n∑
i=2
ln(1 +
rz¯ipi
z¯1p1
) ≤ 0. (71)
Again, by noticing that the function in the LHS of (71) is increasing in r we arrive at (69). 
One can see that for δ → 0 (less uncertainty), (71) becomes
r(σ2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i)− p1z¯1
z¯1p1
≤ 0 ⇔ r(σ2 +∑ni=2 piz¯i)− p1z¯1 ≤ 0
⇔ r ≤ p1z¯1
σ2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i
,
so rp is the standard ratio
p1z¯1
σ2 +
∑n
i=2 piz¯i
.
APPENDIX II: FUNDAMENTAL INEQUALITIES
Lemma 1: It is true that
ln(1 + 1/t) ≥ 1/(t+ 1) ∀ t > 0 (72)
Proof: One can easily check (t + 1) ln(1 + 1/t) ≥ 1 ∀ t > 0 by plotting the graph of function
(t+ 1) ln(1 + 1/t) over (0,+∞). 
Theorem 4: The function f(x, y, t) , ln(1 + 1/xy)1/t is convex in the domain {x > 0, y >
0, t > 0}.
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Proof: Writing f(x, y, t) = (1/t)(ln(xy + 1) − ln x − ln y), it is ease to see that the Hessian
∇2f(x, y, t) is
∇2f(x, y, t) =


2xy + 1
x2(xy + 1)2t
1
(xy + 1)2t
1
t2(xy + 1)x
1
(xy + 1)2t
2xy + 1
y2(xy + 1)2t
1
t2(xy + 1)y
1
t2(xy + 1)x
1
t2(xy + 1)y
2 ln(1 + 1/xy)
t3


 (x2y2(xy + 1)2t3)−1


(xy + 1)y2t2 x2y2t2 t(xy + 1)xy2
x2y2t2 (xy + 1)x2t2 t(xy + 1)x2y
t(xy + 1)xy2 t(xy + 1)x2y 2(xy + 1)x2y2

 ,(73)
where the inequality (72) has been applied to the (3, 3)-th entry of ∇2f(x, y, t) to arrive the
matrix inequality in (73). Here and after, A  B for matrices A and B means that A− B is a
positive definite matrix. Then, calculating the subdeterminants of matrix in the right hand side
(RHS) of (73) yields (xy + 1)y2t2 > 0,∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
x2(xy + 1)t
1
(xy + 1)2t
1
(xy + 1)2t
1
y2(xy + 1)t
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = x
2y2t4(2xy + 1) > 0
and ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(xy + 1)y2t2 x2y2t2 t(xy + 1)xy2
x2y2t2 (xy + 1)x2t2 t(xy + 1)x2y
t(xy + 1)xy2 t(xy + 1)x2y 2(xy + 1)x2y2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= x4y4t4(xy + 1)[(xy + 1)3 − 1] > 0.
Therefore the matrix in the RHS of (73) is positive definite, implying that the Hessian∇2f(x, y, t)
is positive definite, which is the necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity of f [24].

As the function f(x, y) , ln(1 + 1/xy) is convex in the domain {x > 0, y > 0} it follows
that [24] for every x > 0, y > 0, x¯ > 0 and y¯ > 0,
ln(1 + 1/xy) = f(x, y)
≥ f(x¯, y¯) + 〈∇f(x¯, y¯), (x, y)− (x¯, y¯)〉
= ln(1 + 1/x¯y¯) +
1/x¯y¯
1 + 1/x¯y¯
(2− x/x¯− y/y¯). (74)
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Similarly, for the convex function f(x, y, t) , ln(1 + 1/xy)1/t, one has the following inequality
for every x > 0, y > 0, t > 0, x¯ > 0, y¯ > 0 and t¯ > 0,
ln(1 + 1/xy)
t
= f(x, y, t)
≥ f(x¯, y¯, t¯) + 〈∇f(x¯, y¯, t¯), (x, y, t)− (x¯, y¯, t¯)〉
=
2 ln(1 + 1/x¯y¯)
t¯
+
1/x¯y¯
t¯(1 + 1/x¯y¯)
(2− x/x¯− y/y¯)− ln(1 + 1/x¯y¯)
t¯2
t (75)
Analogously, the inequality
− ln(1 + x)
t
≥ 2α− ln(1 + x¯)
t¯
+
x¯
t¯(1 + x¯)
− x
t¯(1 + x¯)
− α− ln(1 + x¯)
t¯2
t− α
t
∀ 0 ≤ x ≤M,α ≥ ln(1 +M) + 0.5 (76)
follows from the convexity of function
α− ln(1 + x)
t
over the trust region 0 ≤ x ≤M .
Lastly, the inequality
ln(1 + x/y) ≤ ln(1 + x¯/y¯) + 1
1 + x¯/y¯
(0.5(x2/x¯+ x¯)/y − x¯/y¯) (77)
follows from the concavity of function ln(1 + z) and then the inequality
x = 0.5(x2/x¯+ x¯)− 0.5(x− x¯)2/x¯
≤ 0.5(x2/x¯+ x¯) ∀x > 0, x¯ > 0. (78)
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